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Credit contracting between a lender with a market power and a small start-up 
entrepreneur may lead to a rejection of projects whose expected benefits are higher 
than their total costs when an adverse selection is present. This inefficiency may be 
eliminated by a government support in the form of credit guarantees or subsidies. 
The principal-agent model of this paper compares different forms of government 
support and concludes that a guarantee defined as a proportion of a gross interest 
rate is not a sufficiently robust policy instrument. Lump-sum guarantees and 
interest  rate subsidies are evaluated as better instruments because they have a 
nonambiguous positive effect on a social efficiency since they enable funding of 
socially efficient projects which would not be financed otherwise.  
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 1 Introduction
The topic of this paper is the public provision of subsidies and guarantees in the credit
market characterized by an information asymmetry and a market power of a lender. In the
following paragraphs we characterize the main results obtained from our principal-agent
model of adverse selection.
The paper concentrates on the socially eﬃcient projects which would be ﬁnanced by
a lender who would have available the same information as a borrower. The introduction
of information asymmetry may lead to credit rationing under which some socially eﬃcient
projects would not be ﬁnanced. The credit rationing by a lender with market power takes
a speciﬁc form of redlining – i.e. rejection of credit to particular group of borrowers.
Our binary result of credit being either provided or rejected is diﬀerent from the well-know
phenomenon of credit rationing obtained in a big family of related models, where the credit
rationed borrower obtains credit with some probability π ∈ (0,1). Our modeling result
of redlining is easier to reconcile with the empirically observed lending practices than
the random provision of credit predicted by the model of adverse selection at perfectly
competitive credit markets. Another interesting new result of general importance is the
ﬁnding that the choice of redlined borrower depends on the strength of adverse selection as
captured in the relative diﬀerence between good and bad borrowers. As long as this relative
diﬀerence is suﬃciently strong, the entrepreneur with ex ante lower chance of success is
the one who may be redlined. This empirically plausible result is reversed (the borrower
with high chance of success may be redlined) if the relative diﬀerence in chances of success
is too low.
The main part of the paper deals with three diﬀerent forms of government interventions
which may be used to decrease the extent of redlining socially eﬃcient projects. We show
that from the government budget point of view the desirability of interest rate subsidies,
proportional guarantees and lump-sum guarantees is crucially dependent on the strength
1of adverse selection. This result provides theoretical support to the empirically observed
fact that governments sometimes prefer subsides, sometimes guarantees. The only result
of our model, which is suﬃciently robust with respect to the strength of adverse selection,
is the dominance of lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsidies over proportional
guarantees. Proportional guarantees are dominated by other intervention instruments both
with respect to their budget cost and with respect to their feasibility to eliminate redlining.
In our leading case of suﬃciently strong adverse selection the cheapest way for government
budget to eliminate redlining is to use lump-sum guarantees.
The analysis of the government interventions into credit markets is a subject of many
theoretical or empirical articles in an academic literature. The most relevant theoretical
ones with respect to our paper are the papers dealing with government support in the
theoretical models of credit provision with ﬁnancial informational frictions. DeMeza and
Webb (1987) and Innes (1991) focus their attention on the eﬃciency of public interventions
connected with variable size of investment projects. The model introduced by DeMeza
and Webb (1987) is further developed by Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000). Similar topics
are also covered by DeMeza (2002), Cressy (2002), and Lerner (2002). As opposed to our
model of adverse selection, Williamson (1994) and Wang and Williamson (1998) investigate
government interventions designed to overcome information asymmetries caused by costly
state veriﬁcation. The models closely related to our papers are used by Gale (1990) and
Smith and Stutzer (1989). All these models are dealing with the perfectly competitive
markets. The assumption of perfectly competitive markets is also shared in the models of
government subsidies and guarantees provided by Lacker (1994) and Li (1998, 2002).
Arping, Loranth, and Morrison (2008) model the state sponsored credit guarantees and
loan subsidies in a setting where entrepreneurs are capital constrained and subject to moral
hazard. In their model, guarantees can raise social welfare because they reduce the cost of
capital faced by entrepreneurs, and so potentially enhance entrepreneurial eﬀort incentives.
They also show that overly generous guarantees have perverse incentive eﬀects since they
2induce lenders to reduce lending standards and to lower their collateral requirements.
Government guarantees and subsidies for commercial credit are often targeted towards
the small and medium size ﬁrms. The problem of insuﬃcient ﬁnancial resources for big
investment projects is sometimes addressed by government guarantees and subsidies too,
but usually other resources like the government support in the form of creating favorable
conditions for foreign direct investment (Gersl (2008), Gersl and Hlavacek (2007)) are
preferred.
An important example of the program targeted to small and medium size enterprises
(SME) is US Small Business Administration (SBA). Since its creation in 1953, SBA en-
gaged in provision of direct loans and bank loan guarantees. After recognizing that com-
mercial banks are usually better than government institution in identifying which projects
to support, SBA started to switch from direct loans towards loan guarantees in the mid-
1980s. Currently, in 2007-2008, the SBA extends direct loans only under very special
circumstances and specializes on the guaranteed loan program. The guarantees by SBA
are provided to the commercial lenders who ﬁrstly structure their own loans according to
underwriting requirements of SBA and then apply for and receive a guarantee from the
SBA on a portion of the loan. The SBA usually guarantees about 50 to 85 percent of the
amount of a loan. According to SBA (2008) maximum loan size is USD 2 million and the
maximum guarantee on such a loan is USD 1.5 million. The activities of SBA are analyzed
by Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2008).
In the Europe, the credit guarantee institutions concerned with small and medium size
ﬁrms formed a network AECM, which represents 34 guarantee organizations in 18 countries
of the European Economic Area. The AECM does not serve as any EU counterpart to
SBA in US. The task of AECM is to represent common interest of its member organization,
to promote the harmonisation of the relevant legal framework, to provide information
exchange among its members and to provide proposals and other ideas related to credit
guarantees to economic policy makers, especially in the European Union. While the credit
3support policies in diﬀerent AECM member institutions are diﬀerent, they often share some
common programs and regulation because they usually serve as agents for distribution of
EU support. The members of AECM usually provide not only guarantees but they also
engage in provision of interest rate subsidies or in direct lending.
Credit guarantees are also extensively used by European ﬁnancial institutions like Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment bank
(EIB) and European Investment Fund (EIF). These major international institutions usu-
ally do not provide guarantee for a speciﬁc loan extended by a commercial lender to a
particular borrower. Their guarantees are in general given as a lump sum amount to a
speciﬁc ﬁnancial institution, which is able to use them for support of particular class of
borrowers. The example of such guarantee may be provision of USD 1 million guaran-
tee from EBRD to a leading Kyrgyz microﬁnance lender Bai Tushum in 2006 which was
followed by additional USD 2 million in 2007 (Bai Tushum (2007)).
Signiﬁcant part of EU support of loans for small businesses in currently channeled
through the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP). EUR 1.1 bn
budgeted for CIP for the period 2007–2013 will be used to subsidize loans extended to SMEs
by a range of ﬁnancial institutions. The actual administration of CIP money is done by EIF.
According to EIB (2008) the CIP SME Guarantee Facility comprises four main business
lines: loan guarantees, micro-credit guarantees, equity guarantees and securitisation.
Credit guarantees are not the only form of credit support provided by these institutions.
According to Patacchini and Rapisarda (2003) the EIB provided interest rate subsidies on
its loans under its temporary lending facility in the 1990s. This subsidy was in the form of
interest rebate of 2 base points and it was provided to the ﬁrms which already obtained EIB
loans under easier terms than they would get in commercial credit market. Similarly as
in the case of credit guarantees, international institutions like EIB keep providing indirect
interest rate subsidies on commercial loans extended to SMEs. According to EIB (2008)
the interest rate subsidy is technically realized through EIB lines of credit, by which the
4EIB provides funds to commercial banks at low rates. These low rates are then passed on
to SMEs through lower interest rates on the commercial loans approved by these banks.
Another often used tool of government support to commercial credit provision are in-
terest rates subsidies. In addition to small and medium size ﬁrms promotion they are
especially used for the agricultural credit or the home ﬁnancing. The other classical area
in which interest rate subsidies used to be widely utilized was the export promotion (Crane
and Kohler (1985)). Nowadays, their use is signiﬁcantly restricted by international agree-
ments, especially by World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO agreements explicitly
forbid any use of subsidies promoting export. The exceptions to this general rule are
covered in Arrangement on Oﬃcially Supported Export Credits (2005).
Gudger (1998) and Navajas (2001) provide the description of the practical consider-
ations of the credit guarantees and subsidies programs world-wide. Fukanuma, Nemoto,
and Watanabe (2006) and Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2006) provide country studies of
the eﬀectiveness of credit guarantees and other governmental policies in Japanese credit
market. The French loan guarantee program is analyzed by Lelarge, Sraer, and Thesmar
(2008). Battistin, Gavosto, and Rettore (2001) focus on subsidies for young entrepreneurs
in Italy. Patacchini and Rapisarda (2003) study the impact of interest rate subsidies on
the total amount of borrowing and on the average cost of borrowing for subsidized ﬁrms
in their panel data obtained from a Italian bank with strong market power in a regional
credit market. Janda (2006) empirically investigates the government budget cost of credit
subsidies and guarantees in the Czech agriculture.
Out of these country studies, the Japanese ones are especially interesting since from
1998–2001, the Japanese government implemented a massive credit guarantee program that
was unprecedented in both scale and scope. Using a new panel data set of Japanese ﬁrms
Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2006) empirically test whether government credit programs
do more to stimulate small business investment or serve to worsen adverse selection prob-
lems in credit markets. They ﬁnd evidence consistent with the former. Their empirical
5study concludes that program participants signiﬁcantly increase their leverage, particu-
larly their use of long-term loans, and with the exception of high-risk ﬁrms, become more
eﬃcient. Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that government interventions in credit markets
can be beneﬁcial.
2 Model
We model the provision of credit in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. The
setting of our model follows the papers by Chan and Kanatas (1985), Bester (1985, 1987,
1994), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Schmidt-Mohr (1997), Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr
(1999), DeMeza and Webb (1999, 2000), Cressy and Toivanen (2001), Berger and Udell
(2002), and Janda (2000, 2006).
Our model has two time periods which are referred to as ex ante and ex post. There
are three classes of economic agents in this model. These are government, lenders, and
borrowers. The government is modeled as a benevolent body whose only concern is an
increase in social eﬃciency and whose only role is to distribute exogenously determined
guarantees and subsidies. The role of lenders is to provide ﬁnancial funds which are needed
by borrowers in order to realize their projects. Risk neutral lenders are eﬀectively colluded
and act as a single principal with a market power. The existence of a lender’s market
power is very characteristic for the banking sector in many countries, as documented in the
empirical studies by Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill, and Schobert (2008) and Bikker, Spierdijk,
and Finnie (2007). The supply of funds facing lenders is perfectly elastic, so that the
lenders have available any demanded amount of funds under the unit cost of ρ.
There are two types of risk neutral borrowers in this model, indexed as a type 1 and
type 2. The two types are distinguished by their probability of successfully ﬁnishing their
project, denoted as 0 < δ1 < δ2 < 1, and by their reservation utilities from not participat-
ing in the project, denoted as b1 < b2. A type 1 borrower is labeled as a high risk borrower
6and a type 2 borrower as a low risk borrower. The probability that the random borrower
facing a lender is a type 1 borrower is θ, which is the proportion of type 1 borrowers in the
total population of borrowers.
In the models of adverse selection, it is usual to consider the participation cost (alter-
native return) for the agent to be the same for all types of the agent. This simplifying
assumptions may be questioned. Why the agents should be heterogeneous with respect
to the project analyzed in the adverse selection model and to be homogeneous otherwise?
In reality the probabilities of success in a analyzed project and the outside alternative re-
turns may be independent or positively or negatively correlated. In our model we assume
positive correlation, where type 2 borrower has both higher probability of success in the
contemplated investment project and higher reservation utility. We have chosen to ana-
lyze the positive correlation case since we expect that better entrepreneurs (the ones with
higher chance of success) are likely to obtain better outcomes (higher reservation utility)
in the case they would abstain from the project considered in this model too.
Our model belongs to the family of adverse selection models of business credit pro-
vision, where the ex-ante unobservable diﬀerent abilities of aspiring entrepreneurs create
the selection problem for the lender. The bigger this unobservable diﬀerence in success
probabilities among applicants for credit is, the stronger is the adverse selection problem
for the lender. When we take the relative diﬀerence between the outside alternative re-
turns of entrepreneurs as a ﬁxed reference point, we may distinguish the cases when the
heterogeneity in the terms of success probabilities in a contemplated investment project is
higher or lower than a reference point chosen in this way. Therefore we deﬁne strong and
weak adverse selection in the following sense. The strong adverse selection happens when
the success probabilities δ1 and δ2 are suﬃciently diﬀerent such that δ2
δ1 > b2
b1. Weak ad-
verse selection happens when δ2
δ1 ≤ b2
b1. Notice that the assumption of the same alternative
returns for agent, which is usually imposed in the literature, leads automatically to our
strong adverse selection case. Therefore our weak adverse selection scenario may serve as
7a robustness check on what happens when the usual assumption of uniform participation
cost is relaxed and the diﬀerences in the success probabilities are relatively small.
The assumption of risk neutrality of borrowers serves to emphasize the adverse selection
aspects of this model. In this way we do not confuse the exposition with the implications of
the well known result that the optimal risk sharing arrangement between risk neutral and
risk adverse agents is to have the risk neutral agent bear all the risk. On the intuitive level
we can support the assumption of the risk neutrality of the borrower by pointing out that
the borrower in this model does not ask for a consumer loan, but for a loan for production
purposes. The production activity of the borrower is strictly separated from his personal
life (we are using the framework of a limited liability company).
The borrower can either undertake one risky project, which yields y in the case of
success and 0 in the case of failure, or he can become engaged in some other activity,
which yields an expected return of bi, i ∈ {1,2}. In order to undertake the project, the
borrower has to borrow a ﬁxed amount of money from the lender. The size of this loan is
normalized to 1.
The ﬂow of funds from lenders to borrowers and the repayment of these funds is gov-
erned by contracts. Each lender oﬀers two types of contract. Each contract is a pair
(πi,Ri), i ∈ {1,2} where πi is the probability that the application of the borrower who
chooses this contract will be satisﬁed and he will be really lent money and Ri is the interest
factor (1 + interest rate), which is equal to the required repayment because of our normal-
ization of the loan size to 1. It is possible that both types of contracts will be the same,
which would mean that there will only be one contract pooling all borrowers together.
While this type of interest rate/ probability of rationing contract menu is a standard
approach used in the theoretical literature mentioned at the beginning of this section,
the empirical relevance of credit contracts which specify some nontrivial probability of
rejection seems somehow doubtful. Nevertheless, the solution of our models shows that
in the equilibrium, all credit applications are either accepted or rejected with probability
8one. Therefore the equilibrium credit contracts in our model do not exhibit empirically
disturbing stochastic character.
The expected utility of a borrower of type i who applies for a contract designed for a
borrower of type j is given by:
Uij = πj[δi(y − Rj) − bi]. (1)
The values of all parameters are known by borrowers, lenders and government. The
only informational asymmetry in the model is that lenders or government do not know the
type of borrower.
The expected proﬁt to a lender on one loan provided to a borrower of type i under
asymmetric information is given as:
Bi = πi[δiRi − ρ]. (2)
We assume that in the case that a lender is indiﬀerent between lending and not-lending,
he resolves this tie in the favor of lending.
The government can attempt to reduce the ineﬃciencies created by credit rationing
through three types of interventions in this model. Under the proportional guarantees
program, the government guarantees the payment of the fraction αi of the contracted loan
repayment in the case of zero return from a project. The expected proﬁt equation (2) is
modiﬁed as:
Bi = πi[δiRi + (1 − δi)αiRi − ρ]. (3)
Under the lump-sum guarantees program the government guarantees the payment of
an exogenously determined lump-sum gi in the case of zero return from the project. The
lender’s expected proﬁt equation (2) is modiﬁed as:
Bi = πi[δiRi + (1 − δi)gi − ρ]. (4)
9The third considered type of an intervention is an interest rate subsidy si, which is
paid only in the case of the project’s success, as opposed to guarantees, which are paid
in the case of failure. While the subsidy reduces the interest rate paid by a borrower, we
can treat it analytically just like an exogenous supplement repayment to a lender. The
expected proﬁt equation (2) is then modiﬁed as:
Bi = πi[δi(Ri + si) − ρ]. (5)
The expected utility of a borrower, under all three types of interventions, is still given by
equation (1) since the interventions inﬂuence the borrower’s utility only indirectly through
their impact on the lender’s proﬁt.
3 Economy without Government Intervention
As a benchmark against which ineﬃciencies caused by information asymmetries can be
evaluated, we ﬁrst consider the symmetric information case. Under this scenario the lender
has exactly the same information as borrowers and he is able separate borrowers perfectly
into two diﬀerent markets. The optimal contract for the lender with a market power
is the one in which he maximizes his expected proﬁt subject to individual rationality
(participation) constraint for entrepreneurs who wants to borrow money:
max
(πi,Ri)
B = πi[δiRi − ρ]
s.t.
πi[δi(y − Ri) − bi] = 0, (IRi)
0 ≤ πi ≤ 1,
i ∈ {1,2}.




















1 if δiy − bi − ρ ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
i ∈ {1,2}.
As long as the lender has the same information as the borrower he is able to extract all
surplus, and the individual rationality constraints (IRi) of a borrower i is binding. There
is no ineﬃciency in this case since the project is ﬁnanced and undertaken if and only if
the expected return of a project (δiy) is equal or bigger than the social cost (bi + ρ). The
ﬁnancing decision of the lender with a market power is the eﬃcient one and consequently
there is no eﬃciency reason for government intervention in this case. In the rest of the paper
we will concentrate our attention on the projects satisfying the social eﬃciency criterion
δiy > bi + ρ. (6)
We will investigate the cases when the introduction of information asymmetry between
borrower and lender with a market power leads to the rejection of the project. When
such a rejection happens we will suggest possible government interventions which would
enable ﬁnancing of the socially eﬃcient projects which would not be undertaken because
of information asymmetry.
Under asymmetric information, the lender does not know ex ante the type of en-
trepreneur who asks for a loan. There is a possibility that the entrepreneur will mis-
represent his type. Consequently, the lender in his maximization problem has to take into
account the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraints, which we denote (IC1) and
(IC2) in the following formalization of the lender’s maximization problem:
max 
π1,R1,π2,R2
B = θB11 + (1 − θ)B22
11= θπ1[δ1R1 − ρ] + (1 − θ)π2[δ2R2 − ρ]
s.t.
πi[δi(y − Ri) − bi] ≥ 0, (IRi)
π1[δ1(y − R1) − b1] ≥ π2[δ1(y − R2) − b1], (IC1)
π2[δ2(y − R2) − b2] ≥ π1[δ2(y − R1) − b2], (IC2)
0 ≤ πi ≤ 1,
i ∈ {1,2}.





































































As long as expected return of the project is suﬃciently higher than the social cost,
the credit contract is the pooling one, where all entrepreneurs obtain the ﬁnancing under
12the same conditions. When the diﬀerence between expected return and the social cost
is still positive, but small, the credit contract leads to the separating outcome. In this
separating outcome one of the borrowers obtains his symmetric information contract and
the other one is rejected the credit (is redlined). The pooling outcome is socially eﬃcient
since all projects satisfying social eﬃciency criterion (6) which would be ﬁnanced under
symmetric information are still ﬁnanced. The only diﬀerence between symmetric and
asymmetric information situations is the distribution of social surplus among the lender
and diﬀerent types of borrower. This distributional eﬀect is caused by the result that
in pooling equilibrium one of the borrowers is charged lower price than under symmetric
information.
In the separating outcome with strong adverse selection the outcome intuitively ex-
pected by a practitioner happens. The high risk borrower is redlined if the expected social
surplus generated by his project is small. The separating outcome with weak adverse se-
lection is characterized by redlining of low risk entrepreneurs, which is rather unintuitive
result from the point of view of usual banking practice. Nevertheless this result does not
reject the rationale for government support. From the point of view of keeping a high
enough level of production in the sector targeted by government support, this weak ad-
verse selection case actually presents higher pressure for government intervention than the
strong adverse selection case.
4 Government Interventions
4.1 Economy with Strong Adverse Selection
The credit rationing of high risk borrowers caused by the informational asymmetry between
lender and borrower could be eliminated by government intervention. We consider three
diﬀerent types of government intervention: proportional guarantees, lump-sum guarantees,
13and interest rate subsidies. In the following subsections we analyze the credit market
equilibrium and the government budget impact of these credit support programs.
4.1.1 Proportional Guarantees
The proportional guarantee intervention means that the government guarantees the pay-
ment of the fraction α of the loan in the case of zero return from the project. This leads
to the lender’s expected proﬁt function (3) which was derived in the Model section of this
paper. The optimization problem for the lender with market power in the presence of
proportional guarantees is therefore given as follows:
max 
π1,R1,π2,R2
B = θB11 + (1 − θ)B22
= θπ1[δ1R1 + (1 − δ1)αR1 − ρ] + (1 − θ)π2[δ2R2 + (1 − δ2)αR2 − ρ] (7)
subject to the same conditions as in the case without an intervention.
































1 if δ1y − b1 − ρ ≥ 1−θ
θ (b1
δ1 − b2
δ2)[δ2 + (1 − δ2)α] −
δ1y−b1





2 = 1. (11)
Proof. In Appendix.
For α = 0, the critical expected social surplus for loan being granted to high risk
entrepreneur is identical to the situation without any government support. The inﬂuence
of any proportional guarantee α bigger than zero on the cut-oﬀ value of social surplus
14leading to the credit rationing of high risk entrepreneur is not immediately obvious from
the inequality (10) since the increase in α has both positive and negative eﬀects on the
right hand side of (10). The comparison of these eﬀects shows that implementation of
proportional guarantee decreases the required cut-oﬀ for credit provision if and only if the

















As long as this condition is satisﬁed, redlining of high risk entrepreneur may be elimi-
nated. Obviously, the cheapest way to eliminate credit rationing by proportional guarantees






δ2)δ2 − (δ1y − b1 − ρ)
δ1y−b1





Since government intervention is required only when the numerator of (13) is positive,
positive intervention α is possible if and only if the denominator of (13) is also positive,
which is guaranteed as long as condition (12) is satisﬁed.
4.1.2 Lump-sum Guarantees
Since the government guarantees the payment of an exogenously determined lump-sum g




B = θB11 + (1 − θ)B22
= θπ1[δ1R1 + (1 − δ1)g − ρ] + (1 − θ)π2[δ2R2 + (1 − δ2)g − ρ] (14)
subject to the same conditions as in the case without an intervention.
































1 if δ1y − b1 − ρ ≥ 1−θ
θ (b1
δ1 − b2





2 = 1. (18)
Proof. In Appendix.
For g = 0, we obtain the same result as in the case without intervention. As opposed to
the case of proportional guarantees, the eﬀect of lump-sum guarantees on the cut-oﬀ value
of social surplus determining the redlining of high risk borrower is nonambiguous and it
is immediately obvious. Taking the derivative of a right hand side of (17) with respect to
g, which is equal to (δ1 − 1), we see that an increase in a lump-sum guarantee increases
the chance that a loan to a high risk borrower will be granted with a probability π∗
1 = 1.
Solving the inequality in (17) as an equation provides the smallest value g for which loans






δ2) − (δ1y − b1 − ρ)
1 − δ1
. (19)
4.1.3 Interest Rate Subsidies
The maximization problem of the lender under the interest rate subsidies is given by:
max 
π1,R1,π2,R2
B = θB11 + (1 − θ)B22
= θπ1[δ1(R1 + s) − ρ] + (1 − θ)π2[δ2(R2 + s) − ρ] (20)
s.t. the same conditions as in the the case without an intervention.
The subsidy is paid only in the case of the project’s success, as opposed to guarantees
which are paid in the case of failure. The subsidy is just an exogenous supplement to
16a repayment to a lender and it does not enter into the (IC) and (IR) constraints of a
borrower.








































2 = 1. (24)
Proof. In Appendix.
In the same way as in the cases of guarantees, we obtain the same result as in the
credit market without intervention if s = 0. Taking the derivative of the right hand side
of (23) with respect to s, which is equal to (−δ1), we immediately see that an increase in
interest payment subsidies increases the chance that the loan to a high risk borrower will
be granted with a probability π∗
1 = 1. Solving inequality in (23) as an equation provides





δ2) − (δ1y − b1 − ρ)
δ1
. (25)
4.1.4 Government Budget Impact of Interventions
In order to compare government budget impact of various types of interventions we consider
such values Gs,Gg,Gα of subsidies s, lump-sum guarantees g, and proportional guarantees
α which make sure that a loan to a type 1 borrower will be always granted with a probability
π∗
1 = 1. From (20) we get the expected budget cost of government subsidies:
Gs = θδ1s + (1 − θ)δ2s = s[θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2]. (26)
17From (14) we get the expected budget cost of lump-sum guarantees:
Gg = θ(1 − δ1)g + (1 − θ)(1 − δ2)g = g{1 − [θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2]}. (27)
From (7) we get the expected budget cost of proportional guarantees:
Gα = α(y −
b1
δ1




){1 − [θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2]}. (28)
In order to compare the costs of subsidies and lump-sum guarantees we substitute s
from (25) into (26) and g from (19) into (27) and we compare Gs and Gg:




δ2) − (δ1y − b1 − ρ)
1 − δ1




δ2) − (δ1y − b1 − ρ)
δ1
[θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2].
This can be simpliﬁed as:









) − (δ1y − b1 − ρ)]
(1 − θ)(δ1 − δ2)
(1 − δ1)δ1
< 0. (29)
This shows that in order to eliminate credit rationing of high risk borrowers, it is cheaper
for the government to use lump-sum guarantees than subsidies.
To compare the costs of proportional guarantees Gα and lump-sum guarantees Gg, we
substitute α from (13) into (28):
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i < 0 (30)
18The inequality (30) is satisﬁed if and only if inequality (12) is satisﬁed.
Since the positive proportional guarantee α can be used only if (12) is satisﬁed, the
inequality (30) implies that the lump-sum guarantees are cheaper for the government than
proportional guarantees.
When comparing Gs and Gα we get:
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The result of the comparison of budget cost of diﬀerent intervention programs is that
lump-sum guarantees are the cheapest form of intervention. When the yield from a suc-
cessful project y is very high so that inequalities (31) and (12) are satisﬁed, it is possible
to use proportional guarantees which are cheaper for the government than subsidies (but
they are still more expensive than lump-sum guarantees). If the size of a return in a suc-
cessful state of nature is intermediate, so that (12) is satisﬁed and (31) is not, then it is
still possible to use the proportional guarantees, but they are in this case the most costly
intervention program for a government budget.
Since the subsidies are paid in the case of success and guarantees are paid in the case of
failure, the result that guarantees are cheaper for the government is quite intuitive for high
probabilities of success δi. What is not so obvious is that according to (29), guarantees are
cheaper even in the case of low probabilities of a success.
From the point of view of a lender, the ordering of the desirability of diﬀerent forms of
government interventions is exactly reversed since the lender prefers the highest possible
transfers from the government.
194.2 Economy with Weak Adverse Selection
The structure of maximization problems facing lenders and the approach to their solution
is the same as in the analysis of government interventions in the strong adverse selection
economy case (as presented in the section 4.1) with modiﬁcations along the lines of the
analysis of the weak adverse selection economy (as presented in the proof of credit contract
under asymmetric information).





























1 if δ2y − b2 − ρ ≥ A,
0 otherwise.
The expression A in the solution for π∗






































If the government decides to remove the redlining of low risk borrowers, it is always
possible to do it in the economy with weak adverse selection by using lump-sum guarantees
or interest rate subsidies.
20In the case of proportional guarantees, it is possible to remove the redlining of low risk

















The comparison of budget impacts of lump-sum guarantees and subsidies, where budget
cost Gg,Gs and the sizes of government interventions s,g are deﬁned analogically as in the
strong adverse selection case, shows that:















This means that it is cheaper for the government to use subsidies than lump-sum guar-
antees. This result is completely opposite to the ﬁnding in the case of a strong adverse
selection.
The comparison of budget impacts of lump-sum guarantees and proportional guarantees
shows that:
























So, in a weak adverse selection case the ordering of budget costs required to remove the
redlining of low risk borrowers is Gα > Gg > Gs.
Possible recommendation on the use of diﬀerent forms of government support are usu-
ally based on the assumption that the government is choosing the forms of support such
that the government monetary outlays are minimized. If we admit the possibility that the
political inﬂuence of lenders is strong enough to ensure that the government intervention
programs are biased toward providing high transfers to banks, then the situation is re-
versed. Under this diﬀerent political economy scenario we should expect credit guarantees
to be prevalent in a weak adverse selection and credit subsidies to be prevalent in a strong
adverse selection case.
215 Conclusions
This paper presents a policy-relevant model of government interventions in a credit market.
The credit guarantees and subsidies provided essentially automatically by government to all
applicants, who passed the credit screening process by the commercial bank, are potentially
very strong policy instruments. Our model shows that they are also eﬃcient instruments,
as long as the forms of credit support are chosen in a right way. The policy relevance of
our model is obvious from the fact, that the model is based on basic features of a number
of successful credit support programs all over the world. The introduction of the credit
support program is especially beneﬁcial in the time of credit crunch on sectoral level, as
happened in agriculture and other restructured industries in many transition economies in
nineties, or on economy-wide level, which was the case in Japan during 1998–2001.
The public support of commercially granted credit does not exhibit the squeeze out
eﬀect on commercial loans which may be caused by direct governmental provision of soft
loans. Nevertheless there are still two contradictory eﬀects of this type of public inter-
vention. The positive eﬀect is the alleviating of the credit crunch and enabling the banks
to ﬁnance potentially proﬁtable business projects which would not be ﬁnanced otherwise.
The negative eﬀect could be connected with adverse selection and moral hazard problems
associated with subsidized lending, which we did not consider in this paper. There could
be an adverse selection where primarily companies with low proﬁtability and socially in-
eﬃcient projects would use the public support program. Or there could be a signiﬁcant
moral hazard on the side of banks which would not exercise due screening of the loan ap-
plicants and would not provide proper monitoring of the approved loans. The experience
of both transition economies with sectoral credit support programs which was analyzed
by Janda (2008) and the Japanese economy-wide program open to all small and medium
enterprises (SME) which was analyzed by Fukanuma, Nemoto, and Watanabe (2006) and
Uesugi, Sakai, and Yamashiro (2006) show that the positive eﬀects prevailed and credit
22support programs had a positive impact on the economy.
The experience of US SBA credit support program and the practice of many European
credit support institutions participating in AECM network shows that the public policy
role for government credit guarantees and interest rate subsidies is viable not only in the
economies troubled with credit crunches or restructuring, but it is appropriate in a highly
developed economies in any phase of the business cycle too. The related problems of cyclical
increases of credit risk which leads to higher demand for government credit support are
analyzed from the macroeconomic perspective by Jakubik (2007).
The model of this paper starts with the benchmark situation of an information sym-
metry between lender and borrower. As long as there is a symmetric information on the
characteristics of the participants in the credit market, the lender with market power is
perfectly able to discriminate and to fully extract all surplus from borrowers. Each bor-
rower is oﬀered a diﬀerent rate of interest. In the conditions of an asymmetric information,
there are two possible outcomes of the lender’s decision process. If the social surplus from
the realization of the project of the borrower who has a lower interest payment under per-
fect information is suﬃciently high, than both types of borrowers are pooled together. The
pooled borrowers are oﬀered the same contract. Otherwise the borrowers are separated.
In a strong (weak) adverse selection economy, the following happens. Under a pooling
equilibrium, a high risk (low risk) borrower will expect to just break even and a low risk
(high risk) borrower will expect a positive surplus. Under a separating equilibrium, a low
risk (high risk) borrower will expect just to break even and a high risk (low risk) borrower
will be rejected credit. The separating equilibrium is socially ineﬃcient under both regimes
since the borrowers’ projects, which generate a positive social surplus, are not undertaken.
This seems especially wasteful in the weak adverse selection case since the borrowers who
get ﬁnanced are not the borrowers with the highest chance of success.
The social ineﬃciency created by the rejection of socially eﬃcient projects presents a
clear case for possible government interventions. This paper analyzes three types of gov-
23ernment intervention: proportional credit guarantees, lump-sum credit guarantees, and
interest rate subsidies. Credit guarantees and subsidies are the main intervention instru-
ments used by many governments in credit market support. The government intervention
in our model is realized only under such combination of projects’ and borrowers’ character-
istics, which lead to redlining of one type of borrower. The government has no information
advantage over lenders or borrowers required to conduct credit market interventions.
The main idea behind government interventions is to decrease the critical level of the
expected return required by lenders in order to provide loans to borrowers with a lower
interest repayment in the case of full information. The optimal level of government support
equates this critical level with the symmetric information state so that all socially eﬃcient
projects are undertaken.
The model of this paper shows that the guarantee deﬁned as a proportion of a gross
interest rate is not a suﬃciently robust political instrument. The reason is that the size
of the government support is not in this case suﬃciently endogenous. It is determined by
the interest rate chosen by a lender who takes a government guarantee into account in
his optimization problem. For some values of the exogenous parameters, an increase in a
government proportional guarantee decreases the critical level of a required return on a
high risk borrower’s loans, and for some values this critical level is increased. Moreover, for
some combinations of exogenous parameters (proportions of high risk types in population,
reservation utilities, probabilities of successful projects) there does not exist a positive
proportional guarantee which would ensure the realization of all socially eﬃcient projects.
The other two instruments (government lump-sum guarantees and interest rate subsi-
dies) have nonambiguous eﬀects on social eﬃciency. Both enable the government to ensure
that all socially eﬃcient projects will be undertaken. The principal diﬀerence between
these two instruments is in their budgetary implications, which are quite diﬀerent for the
economies with a strong and a weak adverse selection. The expected size of monetary
transfer from the government to lenders is lowest for lump-sum guarantees in a strong
24adverse selection. It is lowest for interest rate subsidies in a weak adverse selection.
This means that as long as the participation cost of low risk entrepreneurs are suﬃ-
ciently close to the participation cost of high risk entrepreneurs, the budget-cost-minimizing
government should prefer guarantees over interest rate subsidies as an intervention instru-
ment for elimination of credit rationing in a targeted credit market segment. Our results
show that a relaxation of usually maintained modeling assumption of uniform participation
cost for all borrowers does not eliminate the theoretical argument for the desirability of
government support. But it has an eﬀect on the choice of the most cost-eﬃcient form of
this support in the case that the diﬀerence in the participation costs is suﬃciently high.
Government intervention is always favorable both for redlined and ﬁnanced types of en-
trepreneurs. The entrepreneur, who would be credit rationed in the absence of government
support, will be able to run his project and the other type of entrepreneur will receive bet-
ter contract conditions than would be the case in the absence of government intervention.
A low risk type of borrower is made better oﬀ by government intervention in the strong
adverse selection case since the induced pooling means that a low risk borrower gets to
keep a positive surplus as compared to just breaking even under a separating equilibrium.
The same is true for a high risk borrower in the weak adverse selection case.
As our model shows, the public support of commercial credit provision is beneﬁcial for
all borrowers and lenders. This may explain the widespread use of these programs and their
favorable treatment by policymakers, ﬁnanciers and businessmen. The lenders appreciate
not only the possibility to extend the guaranteed credit, but they beneﬁt from the positive
eﬀect of government guarantees on their regulatory capital (Teply (2007)). Channeling the
government funds through the commercial lending instead of direct provision of subsidies
to ﬁrms is also considered to be a generally accepted practice. The ﬁrm owners may prefer
to receive lump-sum payments in a form of direct government subsidies, but they realize
that tying the government support with commercial loans may actually bring more funds
available for the ﬁrm. Additionally the entrepreneurs realize, that provision of indirect
25support through credit guarantees and subsidies to commercially extended credit is easier
to accept for general public and for policymakers than asking for direct support from public
funds.
The danger of government support channeled through the lender with a market power
could be that the lender may adjust the terms of lending such that all beneﬁts would accrue
to him and the borrower would not be better oﬀ after the intervention. Our model shows
that this situation will not happen with the credit guarantees and interest rate subsidies.
Since all the borrowers will be strictly better oﬀ, this type of intervention is universally
acceptable for politicians, voters and civil servants. The widespread acceptance of this type
of support also means that it is diﬃcult to remove it unless a diﬀerent form of support is
oﬀered instead. As an example of successful downsizing we could mention the importance of
commercial credit guarantees and interest rates subsidies provided to farmers in the Czech
Republic by the Supporting and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund since 1994.
This very successful program was responsible for a signiﬁcant part of Czech government
expenditures on agriculture policy in the second half of nineties, but its funding signiﬁcantly
diminished with the gradual incorporation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of
EU. Czech farmers and agricultural policymakers were willing to sacriﬁce public funding
for commercial credit support in return for higher payments from EU and Czech public
funds in the framework of CAP.
The result of our model that in some situation credit guarantees are better support
instrument and in some cases interest rate subsidies perform better is consistent with the
fact, that policymakers across the world are using both subsidies and guarantees and that
the relative weights of these two instruments change over the time. The ﬁnding that the
lump-sum guarantees are better instrument than proportional guarantees may serve as an
interesting recommendation to the economic policymakers. According to our model the
provision of guarantees which are not directly related to the interest rate payments is more
robust policy instrument. This ﬁnding supports the practice of international institutions
26like EBRD, EIB, or EIF which provide lump-sum guarantee support to ﬁnancial interme-
diaries without ties to the details of the loans provided to the ﬁnal beneﬁciaries of their
programs.
6 Appendix - The Proofs
6.1 Economy without Government Intervention
We ﬁrst prove the part of the solution dealing with strong adverse selection. We start with
assumption that the constraints (IC1) and (IR2) will not be violated in the solution, that
is, we ﬁrst ignore (IC1) and (IR2). This means that a high risk borrower will always non-
strictly prefer his contract to a low risk borrower’s contract, and that a low risk borrower
will obtain a positive surplus.
In this “less-constrained” problem we hold πi as parameters and we optimize with
respect to Ri. We, then, substitute the solutions Ri(π1,π2) into the original maximization
problem and we optimize with respect to πi. Having solved the “less-constrained” problem,
we show that this solution indeed satisﬁes (IC1) and (IR2).
The Lagrangian for the “less-constrained” problem is:
max 
R1,R2
L = θπ1[δ1R1 − ρ] + (1 − θ)π2[δ2R2 − ρ] −
µ{π1[δ2(y − R1) − b2] − π2[δ2(y − R2) − b2]} + λπ1[δ1(y − R1) − b1].
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are given by FOC:
∂L
∂R1
= θπ1δ1 + µπ1δ2 − λπ1δ1 = 0,
∂L
∂R2
= (1 − θ)π2δ2 − µπ2δ2 = 0,
and by (IC2), (IR1), complementary slackness conditions, and non-negativity of multipliers.
27When πi = 0, the corresponding values of R∗
i can be set equal to any value since the
loan is not granted anyway. If π∗
i = 0 only for one type of a borrower, the other type is
treated as in the full information case.
We solve the FOC for the values of multipliers:
µ = 1 − θ,
λ =
θδ1 + (1 − θ)δ2
δ1
.
A positive value of a multiplier λ implies through a complementary slackness that (IR1)
is binding, which means:
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Substituting these optimal values of R∗
i into the lender’s objective function gives the
lender’s utility as a function of π1 and π2.










)] + π2(1 − θ)(δ2y − b2 − ρ).
The FOC for this problem are:
∂Z
∂π2 = (1 − θ)(δ2y − b2 − ρ) > 0 ⇒ π∗
2 = 1,
∂Z





























To check that the solution to the “less-constrained” problem satisﬁes (IC1),we ﬁrst
substitute into (IC1) the values of R∗
i for π∗
i = 1. This simpliﬁes as 0 ≥ 0, which means
that (IC1) will be satisﬁed by the solution of the “less-constrained” problem. Then we
substitute into (IC1) the values of R∗
i for π∗
1 = 0, π∗
2 = 1. In that case, (IC1) simpliﬁes as
b1
δ1 ≥ b2
δ2, which is by deﬁnition always true in the strong adverse selection case.
To verify that the solution to the “less-constrained” problem satisﬁes (IR2), we ﬁrst
substitute into (IR2) the value of C∗
2 for π∗







Rewriting (33) as δ2
δ1 ≥ b2
b1, we see that it is satisﬁed when the relative disparities in
opportunities costs are smaller than the relative diﬀerences between success probabilities.
This is the condition which deﬁnes our strong adverse selection case.
In the case π∗
1 = 0, π∗
2 = 1, we obtain, after a substitution of appropriate value of R∗
2
into (IR2), a trivial truism 0 ≥ 0 which means that (IR2) is satisﬁed.
By this we proved the solution for the case of strong adverse selection. Now we ﬁnish
the proof with the case of weak adverse selection. We ﬁrst assume that the constraints
(IC2) and (IR1) will not be violated in the solution, that is, we ﬁrst ignore (IC2) and (IR1).
Going through the same steps as in the strong adverse selection case, we ﬁnd that:
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6.2 Government Interventions with Strong Adverse Selection
6.2.1 Proportional Guarantees
We follow the strategy used in the case without an intervention.
The Lagrangian for the “less-constrained” problem is:
max 
R1,R2,
L = θπ1[δ1R1 + (1 − δ1)αR1 − ρ] + (1 − θ)π2[δ2R2 + (1 − δ2)αR2 − ρ] −
µ{π1[δ2(y − R1) − b2] − π2[δ2(y − R2) − b2]} + λπ1[δ1(y − R1) − b1].
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are FOC:
∂L
∂R1
= θπ1[δ1 + (1 − δ1)α] + µπ1δ2 − λπ1δ1 = 0,
∂L
∂R2
= (1 − θ)π2[δ2 + (1 − δ2)α] − µπ2δ2 = 0,
and (IC2), (IR1), complementary slackness conditions, and non-negativity of multipliers.
We solve the FOC for the values of multipliers:
µ = (1 − θ)









Since (IR1) and (IC2) are the same as in the case without intervention, and multipliers
λ and µ are again positive, we get the same optimal values of R∗
i as in the case without
intervention.
30Substituting these optimal values of R∗
i into the lender’s objective function gives the
lender’s utility as a function of π1 and π2.
To get the values of probabilities π1,π2, we solve the problem:
max
(π1,π2)
Z = π1{θ[δ1y − b1 − ρ +
δ1y − b1
δ1







)[δ2 + (1 − δ2)α]} +







= (1 − θ)[δ2y − b2 − ρ +
δ2y − b2
δ2






= θ[δ1y − b1 − ρ +
δ1y − b1
δ1












     
     
1 if δ1y − b1 − ρ ≥ 1−θ
θ (b1
δ1 − b2
δ2)[δ2 + (1 − δ2)α]−
δ1y−b1
δ1 (1 − δ1)α,
0 otherwise.
(35)
The rest of the solution (checking our assumptions about (IC1) and (IR2)) is identical
to the case without intervention.
Q.E.D.
6.2.2 Lump-sum Guarantees
The strategy employed is similar to the case with a proportional guarantee.
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are FOC:
∂L
∂Ri
= θπ1δ1 + µπ1δ2 − λπ1δ1 = 0,
∂L
∂R2
= (1 − θ)π2δ2 − µπ2δ2 = 0,
31and (IC2), (IR1), complementary slackness conditions, and non-negativity of multipliers.
Similarly like in the case without intervention multipliers λ and µ are again found to
be positive and optimal values of R∗
i are the same as in the case without intervention.
The lender’s objective function is as follows:
max
(π1,π2)




























1 if δ1y − b1 − ρ ≥ 1−θ
θ δ2(b1
δ1 − b2




6.2.3 Interest Rate Subsidies
The problem is identical to the problem without intervention up to a formulation of the
lender’s maximization of utility function Z with respect to π1,π2 :
max
(π1,π2)
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